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Costly punishment of cheaters who contribute little or nothing to a cooperating group has been extensively
studied, as an effective means to enforce cooperation. The prevailing view is that individuals use punishment
to retaliate against transgressions of moral standards such as fairness or equity. However, there is much debate
regarding the psychological underpinnings of costly punishment. Some authors suggest that costly punish-
ment must be a product of humans’ capacity for reasoning, self-control and long-term planning, whereas
others argue that it is the result of an impulsive, present-oriented emotional drive. Here, we explore the
inter-temporal preferences of punishers in a multilateral cooperation game and show that both interpretations
might be right, as we can identify two different types of punishment: punishment of free-riders by cooperators,
which is predicted by patience (future orientation); and free-riders’ punishment of other free-riders, which
is predicted by impatience (present orientation). Therefore, the picture is more complex as punishment by
free-riders probably comes not from a reaction against a moral transgression, but instead from a competitive,
spiteful drive. Thus, punishment grounded on morals may be related to lasting or delayed psychological incen-
tives, whereas punishment triggered by competitive desires may be linked to short-run aspirations. These
results indicate that the individual’s time horizon is relevant for the type of social behaviour she opts for.
Integrating such differences in inter-temporal preferences and the social behaviour of agents might help to
achieve a better understanding of how human cooperation and punishment behaviour has evolved.
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Altruistic (costly) punishment refers to the readiness of
humans to punish cheating group members at their own
cost, even in one-shot interactions when no clear future
returns are available. Such costly sanctions are a powerful
instrument for protecting cooperation against exploita-
tion by cheaters, and therefore help to sustain high
cooperation levels [1–8]—a fact that puzzles scientists
across the behavioural and biological sciences.
Despite increasing research interest, the mechanisms
involved in costly punishment are poorly understood.
Costly punishment of free-riders is supposed to be spurred
by a moralistic drive to impose norms of fairness
[2,3,5,7,9–15]. But what if the punishing individual is
also a free-rider? Free-riders’ punishment is unlikely to
be driven by the same moral sentiments. More likely, the
punishment by a free-rider could serve a competitive
desire to achieve a higher pay-off than the other group
members even at the punisher’s own absolute cost
[7,16–19]. Falk et al. [7] described the different nature
of punishment by free-riders versus the punishment by
cooperators. Punishment by free-riders is very sensitive to
the relative cost of punishment: when no improvement ofr for correspondence (kanton@ugr.es).
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By contrast, punishment by cooperators is barely influ-
enced by the cost of punishment, as if cooperators were
ready to teach cheaters a lesson at any cost, even if this
means losing relative standing within the group.
This potentially fundamental difference in motivation
must be kept in mind when investigating the possible dri-
vers of punishment decisions. Moralistic punishment of
norm violations is currently interpreted as either a pro-
duct of humans’ capacity for reasoning, self-control and
long-term planning [9,10] or, at the opposite extreme,
as a result of an impulsive, present-oriented emotional
drive [11–15]. However, within the debate on the
psychological roots of punishment, the possibility that
some punishers (i.e. free-riders or norm-violators) may
be guided by non-moralistic motives has not been
deeply explored. This study focuses on the link between
the punisher’s inter-temporal preferences and the type
of costly punishment she opts for, and explores whether
the two antagonistic forces behind punishment may be
partially predicted by this individual characteristic.
The relationship between inter-temporal preferences
and punishment behaviour has so far been investigated
only with the ultimatum game (UG). The UG is based
on a stake that has to be shared between two individuals
according to the proposal of one of them (proposer),
which the second player (responder) can accept or reject.
If the responder rejects, both players get nothing. RejectionThis journal is q 2012 The Royal Society
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cement. In this game, impatient (present-oriented)
individuals are more prone to reject low offers [11]. This
result seems to back other researchers’ interpretation
that costly punishment is driven by impulsive emotions
[12–15]. According to this view, an ‘irrational’ impulse
would lead the punisher to disregard the future conse-
quences of punishing norm violations. However, the
standard UG doesnot allow disentangling whetherobserved
behaviour is driven by competition on relative outcome—
envy, in psychological terms—or by moralistic reactions
against unfairness, because both natures of punishment
would result in the rejection of low offers (that is, the same
observable behaviour) [20]. In fact, some challenging
neural evidence points to the involvement of self-control
and long-term planning in rejection decisions [9,10].
We analysed the connection between inter-temporal
preferences and the nature of punishment by cooperators
and free-riders, using a one-shot public good game with
punishment (PGP). The PGP makes it easier to disentan-
gle different types of punishers by analysing their
behaviour in the cooperation stage prior to punishment.
Therefore, it allows determining whether the punishing
individuals are in compliance with the norm or not—a
dichotomy that has been found to have critical impli-
cations for cooperation and its evolution [4,8,16,21–23].
We used a one-shot procedure in order to elicit indi-
viduals’ behavioural norms when punishing [5]. In our
PGP, four anonymous players endowed with E10 first
decided how much money to contribute to a common
group pot. The sum of contributions in the pot was
then multiplied by two and shared evenly among the
four group members, which incentivized free-riding on
others’ cooperation. Therefore, although the socially effi-
cient outcome in this game is full cooperation, the Nash
equilibrium based on narrowly defined selfish rationality
predicts full defection. The results of the contribution
stage were then made public, and participants were
allowed to reduce other group members’ earnings at
their own cost (punishment stage). Participants were
allowed to spend up to E3 to reduce other group mem-
bers’ earnings, with each euro spent reducing the target
player’s earnings by E3. This 1 : 3 ratio allows punish-
ment to be implemented with competitive as well as
moralistic goals. However, a selfish individual would
never make use of punishment in our one-shot anon-
ymous setting. We also asked participants how much
punishment they expected to receive from the other
group members (see §4).
Individuals’ manner of discounting delayed outcomes
(i.e. their inter-temporal preferences or impatience) is a
stable personal attribute [24] that unambiguously influ-
ences many fields of human behaviour [25]. High delay
discounting (DD), measuring the willingness to prefer
smaller rewards to larger but more delayed rewards, has
been related to different scales of impulsivity and to les-
sened self-control [26] (however, see [27] for neural
evidence suggesting that self-control and the evaluation of
delayed rewards might respond to different psychological
processes). As DD can predict inter-temporal decisions
[25], it constitutes a helpful method for disentangling
whether individuals perceive a given behavioural strategy
as linked to early or delayed psychological incentives (see
below for a discussion on an alternative interpretation).Proc. R. Soc. BWe obtained DD functions for each participant
through a standard task [28] computing their discounting
parameter k from the hyperbolic characterization [29].
The parameter k represents the steepness of the discount
function. The higher an individual’s k, the more she
discounts delays, and therefore the higher her impatience.
We ran field experiments with 160 participants (mean
age 46.8 years; 64% females) from all walks of life in
southern Spain. By means of non-laboratory experiments,
we expected to attain higher heterogeneity among individ-
uals’ discount rates [30]. We indeed found important
differences in DD among participants (see the electronic
supplementary material, figure S4). The average k in our
sample was 0.759 (+0.034, s.e.m.) in annual terms and
related negatively to different income variables as in
other field studies [31], but it was unrelated to individ-
uals’ contributions to the public good (see the electronic
supplementary material, table S1). This lack of a relation-
ship between DD and contributions might result from the
incentives to strategically cooperate introduced by pun-
ishment (i.e. potential free-riders cooperate in order not
to be punished), because others have found that DD
and contributions are negatively correlated in one-shot
public good games without punishment [32] (see the
electronic supplementary material).2. RESULTS
Sixty participants (37.5%) used the sanctioning mechanism
at least once. The total amount of money reduced through
punishment was E496 (from E2585 earned by
cooperation), with 124 instances of punishment in total
(E124 paid by punishers caused a reduction of E372 to
the punished group members). In figure 1a, we show how
the individual’s DD and her deviation from other group
members’ mean contribution (‘deviation’ henceforth)
impact on her willingness to punish. Individuals contri-
buting more than E1 below the others’ mean (i.e.
deviation, 21) are included within the ‘below average’
category, those around the others’ mean contribution
(deviation between 21 and 1) within ‘average’ and high
contributors (deviation. þ1) within ‘above average’
(same classification as used by Ga¨chter & Herrmann [8]).
To facilitate visual interpretation, DD is depicted in colours,
with k increasing from blue to red. Three categories of
DD are constructed, each with one-third of the sample.
The probability of punishing, P(p), in the vertical axis rep-
resents the fraction of individuals using punishment. That
is, P(p) captures the proportion of punishers within each
category of figure 1a. Evident differences exist between
the punishment patterns of the three DD categories. How-
ever, because DD and deviation are continuous variables,
the proper method to estimate the existing link is through
regression analysis, which also allows controlling for other
personal characteristics given the field origin of data. That
is, the probability of punishing—whether an individual
implements punishment or not—is regressed as a function
of the punisher’s deviation and k (probit regression with
robust standard errors clustered at the group level).
Neither the positive effect of the punisher’s deviation
(p . 0.5) nor the negative effect of k (p . 0.1) on P(p)
reach significance (see the electronic supplementary
material, table S2, model 2), but their interaction does
(p , 0.01; model 4). The predictions of the model are
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Figure 1. Delay discounting (DD), deviation and willingness to punish. This figure shows the willingness to punish (P(p)) as a
function of the punisher’s DD and relative contribution to the public good. Patient punishers are denoted in blue with impa-
tience increasing towards red. (a) DD is divided into three quantiles, each with one-third of the sample (low, medium and high
DD), whereas the punisher’s deviation from other group members’ mean cooperation is split into three theoretical categories:
below average, average and above average. The number of observations in each category (lowDD, medDD, highDD) are: below
average (23, 22, 19), average (13, 10, 13) and above average (19, 20, 21). (b) The punisher’s DD and deviation are plotted as
continuous variables impacting on P(p) from the specification of model 4 of the electronic supplementary material, table S2
(including controls and keeping them at the mean), but using ordinary least squares coefficients (see the electronic supplemen-
tary material, table S3). When comparing both panels, it can be observed that the disparities increase as more extreme cases are
reached. Although the punisher’s deviation theoretically belongs to the interval [210, þ10], in our sample it is reduced to the
interval [28, þ6.667]. The four extreme values (corners) are (k, deviation, P(p)): (0.02, 28, 0.007), (0.02, þ6.667, 0.814),
(1.211, 28, 0.489) and (1.211, þ6.667, 0.204). (a) Empirical data; (b) linear predictions.
Patient and impatient punishers A. M. Espı´n et al. 3shown in figure 1b. It is notable that the strong positive
relationship between deviation and P(p) capturing the be-
haviour of low-DD subjects reverses its slope as DD
moves closer to its highest value. Wald tests reveal that
DD is negatively related to P(p) for extreme positive devi-
ations (most cooperative individuals; p , 0.01), while for
extreme negative deviations (strongly free-riding individ-
uals), the sign of this relationship is positive (p , 0.05).
In sum, punishment from the cooperative side is carried
out by patient individuals, but those impatient individuals
implement punishment when their own contributions are
relatively low.
The next analysis is to explore who receives the punish-
ment by patient cooperators and impatient free-riders.
Figure 2 shows the predicted likelihood of punishing
another group member depending on the punisher’s
and target’s absolute cooperative levels (i.e. their raw con-
tributions, from 0 to 10). Two different panels for the low
and high categories of DD characterized in figure 1a are
presented. For this model (see the electronic supplemen-
tary material, table S6), we use three observations per
subject (one for each partner) with the likelihood of pun-
ishing each partner as the dependent variable (robust
standard errors are clustered to account for correlation
at the individual and group dimensions). The estimate
of the interaction effect between the punisher’s DD and
cooperation is negative and significant (p , 0.01, model
4), thus supporting the previous result using the deviation
variable. The axis in figure 2 representing the punisher’s
cooperation shows that low-DD, future-oriented individ-
uals (figure 2a) are more likely to punish the more
cooperative they are, whereas high-DD, present-oriented
individuals (figure 2b) punish less the more cooperative
they are. On the other hand, the target’s cooperation
always impacts negatively on the likelihood of her beingProc. R. Soc. Bpunished (p , 0.01), meaning that lower contributions
are more likely to get punished. However, the interaction
between the punisher’s DD and the target’s cooperation is
largely insignificant in our model (p . 0.6). Hence,
although free-riding behaviour is most likely to receive
punishment, looking at the behaviour of punishers, it is
patient cooperators and impatient free-riders who head
the retaliation.
Analyses based on the punishment expected by the sub-
jects reveal that patient and impatient individuals do not
have different expectations about what levels of contri-
bution are more likely to get punished (see the electronic
supplementary material, table S5). Also, scrutiny of the
subjects’ expectations on punishment suggests that, in
the eyes of impatient free-riders, punishing other free-
riders seemed to be adequate when it came to fighting
for the relative position (i.e. to beat the rival). This insight
is extracted from the fact that impatient free-riders did not
expect to receive a sufficient level of punishment to put at
risk the pay-off advantage they had over cooperators (see
the electronic supplementary material).3. DISCUSSION
These results indicate that both previous interpretations of
costly punishment might be correct if applied to the right
subpopulation of punishers. Patience is characteristic of
cooperators who decide to punish free-riders. Impatience,
however, links to the punishment of free-riders by other
free-riders. It has been shown that moralistic punishment
benefits the society only in the long run [6]. Therefore,
given its link with future orientation, it is possible that
this kind of punishment is grounded in far-sighted collec-
tive motivations. On the other hand, the punishment
implemented with non-moralistic goals by impatient
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Figure 2. Delay discounting (DD), punisher’s and target’s
cooperation. The figure shows linear predictions from
model 4 of the electronic supplementary material, table S6
(including controls and keeping them at the mean) for the
two extreme DD categories of figure 1a. (a) The predicted
likelihood of low-DD (patient) individuals punishing another
group member as a function of the contribution level of both
the punisher and the target. (b) The same predictions for
high-DD (impatient) individuals. For these plots, we use
the mean k value within the DD category: 0.2884 and
1.211 for low and high DD, respectively. (a) Punisher is
low DD; (b) punisher is high DD.
4 A. M. Espı´n et al. Patient and impatient punishersfree-riders seems to be characteristic of aggressive, ultra-
competitive behaviour, which has previously been found
to be related to present orientation [33].
In the light of recent research on the role of intuition
versus reflection in social decision-making [34,35], one
might wonder whether the decisions on punishment are
also shaped by intuition. Indeed, impatient responses in
DD tasks have also been related to individuals’ predispo-
sition to follow their intuitions [36]. There might
therefore exist an underlying common cognitive process
leading individuals to choose smaller rewards that are
received sooner (i.e. being impatient in DD tasks) and
to behave intuitively without further deliberation. It
would be interesting for future research to analyse
response times of free-riders and cooperators when pun-
ishing in order to unravel whether our results are only
due to individuals’ inter-temporal preferences or instead
driven by a more basic cognitive process [37,38].
From the results, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
negative emotions spur moralistic punishment in the PGPProc. R. Soc. Bbut, if this is the case, these emotions must be founded in
more far-sighted, pro-social sentiments than mere self-
centred revenge or spite. Given that previous research has
found that more impatient responders in the UG are more
likely to reject low offers [11], this new evidence also suggests
a potential difference between cooperators’ punishment in
the PGP and responders’ rejections in the UG. This possi-
bility should be explored in deeper detail in further
research analysing, for instance, whether impatient respon-
ders who reject unfair offers are themselves fair or unfair.
Indeed, Carpenter [39] found that subjects with a competi-
tive social value orientation [19] rather than ‘fairmen’ were
responsible for most rejections in his experiments.
Our findings indicate that inter-temporal preferences
and social behaviour are inter-related with each other in
a much more complex fashion than discussed so far.
Future research has to elicit the exact role of impulse,
habits and reasoning for cooperation and defection [34],
as well as for punishment and reward decisions.
A better understanding of the role of inter-temporal pre-
ferences (and their possible context dependence) for
shaping social and anti-social behaviour of agents might
be important to refine our understanding of how human
cooperation and punishment behaviour has evolved.4. METHODS
One hundred and sixty inhabitants of small, semi-rural popu-
lations (1000–7000 inhabitants) in northern Granada
(Andalusia, Spain) were invited to take part in experiments
designed to elicit their DD and behaviour in a one-shot
public good game with punishment. The participants, 103
of whom were female, were aged between 16 and 82 years
(mean 46.8+18.5 s.d.). The experiments were conducted
in five sessions (32 subjects per session) at five different
locations. Adapted standard instructions were read aloud,
and several examples were illustrated on a whiteboard to
ensure that the participants understood them. An experi-
enced Spanish-speaking experimenter conducted all the
sessions with an identical protocol (available in electronic
supplementary material). The show-up fee was E5, and a
drink and tapas after the experiment.
In the PGP, four anonymous players cooperated by contri-
buting amounts of money from their endowment (E10) to a
common pot. The sum of contributions in the pot was multi-
plied by 2 and evenly shared among the four group members.
Hence, the individual returns of each monetary unit inside the
pot, whatever their cooperative level, were a ¼ 2/4, meaning
that contributing one unit had a cost of 12 a. 0. Thus,
every euro invested in cooperation increased the group’s
earnings by E2, but cost the investor 50 cents.
The participants cooperated simultaneously and were
informed ex ante about the possibility of reducing the other
group members’ pay-offs at a personal cost after the results
of the first contribution stage had been revealed. The price
of punishment was one-third of the total reduction in
income imposed on the punished subject. Reduction through
punishment was limited to a maximum of E9 (i.e. three
punishment opportunities, without restrictions on their dis-
tribution among partners) to rule out negative pay-offs.
The subjects also had to report their expectations regarding
the punishment they would receive from their partners.
For the statistical analyses, we used the likelihood of pun-
ishing and not the intensity of punishment because the
Patient and impatient punishers A. M. Espı´n et al. 5decision to punish and the decision about the amount are
intrinsically different [40], and it was our aim to explore
what is behind the decision of incurring any cost to punish
others. Also, the existing limit for the amount of punishment
implemented (max. E9) generates dramatically different
decisions depending on the distribution of other group mem-
bers’ behaviours, and not only on their mean behaviour.
However, the main results remain similar if we use the inten-
sity of punishment as the dependent variable in the regressions
(available upon request from the authors).
The discounting task for measuring participants’ inter-
temporal preferences was a simplified version of Harrison
et al. [28] involving real monetary incentives with a front-
end delay procedure (both the sooner and the later reward
are delayed). The task consisted of making 20 decisions on
whether to receive E150 one month following the experiment
or a higher amount (increasing from E151.50 to E225) after
six extra months. The decision card contained a table with
two columns (options A and B) and 20 rows. In each row,
option A offered E150 to be received one month after the
experiment, whereas option B offered a higher amount to
be received seven months later. Thus, option B in the first
row offered E151.50 and option B in the 20th row E225.
The participants had to decide between option A and B in
each of the 20 rows. The lower amount at which an individ-
ual was willing to wait half a year was considered her
indifference point (between options A and B). We used the
discounting parameter (k [ [0.02, 1.211]) from the hyper-
bolic characterization [29], calculated at the individual’s
indifference point, because it is the most commonly accepted
functional form among behavioural scientists (see the elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S7 for analyses based
on other discounting functional forms). Data available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.5061/dryad.r7c7p.Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and
Innovation (ECO2010-17049), the Regional Government
of Andalusia (PO7-SEJ-02547) and Fundacio´n Ramo´n
Areces (RþD 2011) is gratefully acknowledged. We also
thank J. A. Abril, A. Corte´s, J. Martı´n, E. M. Mun˜oz,
L. A. Palacios, M. Parravano, L. E. Pedauga, A. Quesada,
M. Roma´n and J. F. Ruano for their research assistance, as
well as M. J. Crockett, S. Ga¨chter, E. Lafuente and
D. G. Rand for their helpful comments. Special thanks to
the authorities and inhabitants of Benalu´a, Darro,
Deifontes, Iznalloz and Pedro Martı´nez. A.M.E., P.B.-G.,
B.H. and J.F.G. designed research and wrote the paper;
A.M.E., P.B.-G. and J.F.G. performed research; A.M.E.
and B.H. analysed the data.REFERENCES
1 Yamagishi, T. 1986 The provision of a sanctioning system
as a public good. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 110–116.
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110)
2 Fehr, E. & Ga¨chter, S. 2002 Altruistic punishment in
humans. Nature 415, 137–140. (doi:10.1038/415137a)
3 Dawes, C. T., Fowler, J. H., Johnson, T., McElreath, R. &
Smirnov, O. 2007 Egalitarian motives in humans. Nature
446, 794–796. (doi:10.1038/nature05651)
4 Herrmann, B., Tho¨ni, C. & Ga¨chter, S. 2008 Antisocial
punishment across societies. Science 319, 1362–1367.
(doi:10.1126/science.1153808)
5 Henrich, J. et al. 2006 Costly punishment across human
societies. Science 312, 1767–1770. (doi:10.1126/science.
1127333)Proc. R. Soc. B6 Ga¨chter, S., Renner, E. & Sefton, M. 2008 The long-run
benefits of punishment. Science 322, 1510. (doi:10.1126/
science.1164744)
7 Falk, A., Fehr, E. & Fischbacher, U. 2005 Driving forces
behind informal sanctions. Econometrica 73, 2017–2030.
(doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00644.x)
8 Ga¨chter, S. & Herrmann, B. 2009 Reciprocity, culture
and human cooperation, previous insights and a new
cross-cultural experiment. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 364,
791–806. (doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0275)
9 Knoch, D., Pascual-Leone, A., Meyer, K., Treyer, V. &
Fehr, E. 2006 Diminishing reciprocal fairness by disrupt-
ing the right prefrontal cortex. Science 314, 829–832.
(doi:10.1126/science.1129156)
10 Knoch, D., Gianotti, L. R. R., Baumgartner, T. & Fehr, E.
2010 A neural marker of costly punishment behaviour. Psy-
chol. Sci. 21, 337–342. (doi:10.1177/0956797609360750)
11 Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Lieberman, M. D., Tabibnia,
G. & Robbins, T. W. 2010 Impulsive choice and altruistic
punishment are correlated and increase in tandem with
serotonin depletion. Emotion 10, 855–862. (doi:10.
1037/a0019861)
12 Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Tabibnia, G., Lieberman,
M. D. & Robbins, T. W. 2008 Serotonin modulates be-
havioural reactions to unfairness. Science 320, 1739.
(doi:10.1126/science.1155577)
13 Pillutla, M. M. & Murningham, J. K. 1996 Unfairness,
anger, and spite: emotional rejections of ultimatum
offers. Organ. Behav. Hum. Dec. 68, 208–224. (doi:10.
1006/obhd.1996.0100)
14 van’t Wout, M., Kahn, R. S., Sanfey, A. G. & Aleman, A.
2006 Affective state and decision-making in the ulti-
matum game. Exp. Brain Res. 169, 564–568. (doi:10.
1007/s00221-006-0346-5)
15 Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom,
L. E. & Cohen, J. D. 2003 The neural basis of economic
decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science 300,
1755–1758. (doi:10.1126/science.1082976)
16 Eldakar, O. T., Farrell, D. L. & Wilson, D. S. 2007 Self-
ish punishment, altruism can be maintained by
competition among cheaters. J. Theor. Biol. 249,
198–205. (doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.07.024)
17 Shinada, M., Yamagishi, T. & Ohmura, Y. 2004 False
friends are worse than bitter enemies: ‘altruistic’ punish-
ment of in-group members. Evol. Hum. Behav. 25,
379–393. (doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.001)
18 Charness, G. & Rabin, M. 2002 Understanding
social preferences with simple tests. Q. J. Econ. 117,
817–869. (doi:10.1162/003355302760193904)
19 Van Lange, P. A. M. 1999 The pursuit of joint outcomes
and equality in outcomes: an integrative model of social
value orientation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 77, 337–349.
(doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.337)
20 Kirchsteiger, G. 1994 The role of envy in ultimatum
games. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 25, 373–389. (doi:10.
1016/0167-2681(94)90106-6)
21 Eldakar, O. T. & Wilson, D. S. 2008 Selfishness as
second-order altruism. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 105,
6982–6986. (doi:10.1073/pnas.0712173105)
22 Helbing, D., Szolnoki, A., Perc, M. & Szabo, G. 2010
Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral
standards through spatial interactions. PLOS Comput.
Biol. 6, e1000758. (doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758)
23 Rand, D. G., Armao IV, J. J., Nakamaru, M. & Ohtsuki,
H. 2010 Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evo-
lution of punishment and cooperation. J. Theor. Biol. 265,
624–632. (doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.010)
24 Kirby, K. N. 2009 One-year temporal stability of delay-
discount rates. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 16, 457–462.
(doi:10.3758/PBR.16.3.457)
6 A. M. Espı´n et al. Patient and impatient punishers25 Chabris, C. F., Laibson, D. I., Morris, C. L., Schuldt, J. P. &
Taubinsky, D. 2008 Individual laboratory-measured dis-
count rates predict field behaviour. J. Risk Uncertainty 37,
237–269. (doi:10.1007/s11166-008-9053-x)
26 Kirby, K. N. & Finch, J. C. 2010 The hierarchical struc-
ture of self-reported impulsivity. Pers. Indiv. Differ. 48,
704–713. (doi:10.1016/j.paid.2010.01.019)
27 Figner, B., Knoch, D., Johnson, E. J., Krosch, A. R.,
Lisanby, S. H., Fehr, E. & Weber, E. U. 2010 Lateral pre-
frontal cortex and self-control in inter-temporal choice.
Nat. Neurosci. 13, 538–539. (doi:10.1038/nn.2516)
28 Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I. & Williams, B. 2002 Esti-
mating individual discount rates in Denmark: a field
experiment. Am. Econ. Rev. 92, 1606–1617. (doi:10.
1257/000282802762024674)
29 Mazur, J. E. 1987 The effect of delay and intervening
events on reinforcement value. In Quantitative analyses
of behaviour, vol. 5 (eds M. L. Commons, J. E. Mazur,
J. A. Nevin & H. Rachlin), pp. 55–73. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
30 Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I. & Rutstro¨m,
E. E. 2010 Preference heterogeneity in experiments:
comparing the field and laboratory. J. Econ. Behav.
Organ. 73, 209–224. (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.09.006)
31 Tanaka, T., Camerer, C. F. & Nguyen, Q. 2010 Risk and
time preferences: linking experimental and household
survey data from Vietnam. Am. Econ. Rev. 100,
557–571. (doi:10.1257/aer.100.1.557)Proc. R. Soc. B32 Curry, O. S., Price, M. E. & Price, J. G. 2008 Patience is
a virtue: cooperative people have lower discount rates.
Pers. Indiv. Differ. 44, 778–783. (doi:10.1016/j.paid.
2007.09.023)
33 Nelson, R. J. & Trainor, B. C. 2007 Neural mechanisms
of aggression. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 8, 536–546. (doi:10.
1038/nrn2174)
34 Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D. & Nowak, M. A. 2012
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. Nature 489,
427–430. (doi:10.1038/nature11467)
35 Schulz, J. F., Fischbacher, U., Tho¨ni, C. & Utikal, V.
In press. Affect and fairness: dictator games under
cognitive load. J. Econ. Psychol.
36 Frederick, S. 2005 Cognitive reflection and decision
making. J. Econ. Perspect. 19, 25–42. (doi:10.1257/
089533005775196732)
37 Rubinstein, A. 2007 Instinctive and cognitive reasoning:
a study of response times. Econ. J. 117, 1243–1259.
(doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02081.x)
38 Haidt, J. 2001 The emotional dog and its rational tail: a
social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychol.
Rev. 108, 814–834. (doi:10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814)
39 Carpenter, J. 2003 Is fairness used instrumentally? Evi-
dence from sequential bargaining. J. Econ. Psychol. 24,
467–489.
40 Carpenter, J. & Matthews, P. H. 2009 What norms trig-
ger punishment? Exp. Econ. 12, 272–288. (doi:10.1007/
s10683-009-9214-z)
